The Piper Oil Field Engineering Essay

The genus bagpiper Oil Field Engineering EssayIntroductionOn the night of June the 6th, 1988, an explosion took place on the bagpiper important anele and vaunt production course of study. It led to a series of fires that eventually melted the political platform into the waters of the labor union Sea, killing a hundred and lx seven men, and resulting in insurance divergencees of U.S. $3.4 billion. To date, it re primary(prenominal)s the worst inshore disaster in the history of the Petroleum industry, defined in terms of twain tender and fiscal loss. The images of horror broadcasted from the disaster site, the final tally of human lives lost(p), and the enormous financial loss shock Occidental Petroleum, the operator of the platform, violently. It has since become worthy of complete(a) examination, to fully assimilate the numerous lessons it has to offer. Ronin Advanced Systems investigated the events leading up to that night, pinpointing the deficiencies in the fragi le Safety Matrix then applied by Occidental Petroleum, in rank to provide viable recommendations that can help prevent such accidents from happening in the future and increase the overall Operational Safety of offshore installations.Purpose and ScopeThe impact of the bagpiper of import disaster on the Petroleum industry was huge. It was on such an unprecedented level that every fossil oil colour company made it an absolute requirement to document it as a Case Study. The purpose of this query is to isolate the faults and errors carried bulge by both the caution of Occidental Petroleum as s intimately as the crew of Piper important, which directly resulted in the disaster. This make-up will cover several topics regarding the Piper Alpha offshore production platform, including its muddle, construction, modification, Safety Matrix and Record, as head as the timeline of the disaster and its aftermath. Throughout the report, we do non include any on-site research from the Pip er oil flying field.AssumptionsOur recommendations are ground on the assumption that the Piper Alpha disaster could have been completely avoided. This is in turn based on the fact that its management made a series of wrong decisions, which seriously compromised the unspoilt level on board the platform and rendered its crew helpless in face of accidents. The failure of the crew to act appropriately with respect to the sequence of events of the disaster can tho be attributed to the failure of Occidentals management.The assumption is handlewise based on the factual and documented deterioration of the refuge level on board the platform after its modification to produce gasconade. Several gas leaks were preserve and a research commissi mavind by Occidental to investigate the newly installed burn out verges which found them of extreme risk was ignored. At the end of this report, we will build without a shred of doubt that the assumption holds thus, deeming our recommendati on worthy of existence dedicate into action as soon as possible.MethodsThe information in this report was compiled from various sources including Lord Cullens Public Inquiry, numerous printed and electronic publications, video footage from the British Royal Air Force helicopters, as well as the numerous actualise vessels, that were present on site during rescue operations and the accounts of the survivors.LimitationsAs mentioned earlier, this research is limited to materials and information available in the Public Do main(prenominal) via the Internet, various publications, and record video footage. In addition, Ronin Advanced Systems was not able to send any personnel to the disaster site to perform on-location examination out-of-pocket to the following main reasonsThe incident happened on July the 6th, 1988.The Piper Alpha offshore production platform melted down to its middle. Furthermore, its remains were later detonated and withdraw by Occidental Petroleum.Piper oil fieldA hundred and twenty miles from Aberdeen, beneath well-nigh of the fiercest waters of the mating Sea, lies the Piper oilfield. A joint venture of quartet companies, cognize as the OPCAL (short for Occidental Petroleum Caledonia) and led by Occidental Petroleum, obtained a license to explore those waters in 1972, after the British government allowed offshore exploration licenses in 1964 (Miller, 1991). The Piper oil field was observed in the early months of 1973, prompting OPCAL to commission the construction of the Piper Alpha platform, as well as the pipelines and Onshore Support Installations. Oil production started in late 1976. At its peak, the Piper oilfield produced 30,000 tons of oil daily. Nearby, ii more fields were discovered those were the Tartan and the Claymore oilfields. Two more platforms were commissioned and named after the two fields respectively. The three vast oilfields Piper, Tartan and Claymore are usually referred to together with as the Piper oilfield. move into 1 Location of Piper Oilfield with respect to Aberdeen and Flotta Oil FacilityAs shown in haoma 1, OPCAL built the Flotta oil termination on the Orkney Islands to collect and process oil from the three colossal fields. As the development of the three platforms progressed, more oil and gas lines were laid, resulting in Piper being at the heart of a busy network of pipelines. Its platform acted as both a communication systems hub as well as an oil and gas collection point, in the first place relaying it all onto shore on one main line, namely the Main Oil imbibe or MOL, which is the line seen connecting the Piper field and Flotta in skeletal frame 1. This report will dedicate an unblemished subsection to further examine the pipeline network surrounding the Piper oilfield and its neighbouring counterparts. It will likewise discuss the impacts that network had on the level of Operational Safety on board the Piper Alpha platform and how it actively contributed to its tr agic and total annihilation off the waters of the North Sea.Piper AlphaPiper Alpha, the platform that exploited the Piper oilfield, stood tall at two hundred metres above seabed. Its miasmic size made it seem almost indestructible. It was originally knowing for oil production, but was later adapted to produce natural gas as well a decision that proved to have tragic consequences. Producing almost ten percent of Britains North Sea oil and gas in 1988, Piper Alpha was highly productive. It was deemed a lucrative investment for Occidental Petroleum, shoring millions of dollars annually. It is assumed that at the time of the accident, the platform was the heaviest offshore production rig operating in the North Sea. come in 2 Piper Alpha Offshore Oil bodge Production PlatformPiper Alpha was a fixed platform constructed by McDermott Engineering at Ardesier and UIE at Cherbourg, with sections united at Ardersier during 1975 (Wikipedia, 2010). The platform consisted of four modules (A, B, C and D) separated by Fire-Proofed walls, and arranged such that the most self-destructive works such as drilling were as far as possible from the Accommodation Block. At the time of the accident, the platform operated cardinal-six well heads employ various technologies that were then available. Figure 3, an East-side Elevation of the platform, illustrates its modular design and the locations of the battlegrounds of interest to the scope of this report, mainly Modules C, D and the Oil Separation Compartment in Module B.Figure 3 East Elevation of Piper Alphathe impacts of the 1980 Gas module fittingImpact on the platform LayoutI Production Level 84In 1980, a Gas Recovery Module was installed on the Piper Alpha platform. This decision left hand an unfortunate legacy in its design, as some of the gas crunch works had to be sited in Module C, which was later called the Gas Compression Module. Figure 4 illustrates the layout of Production Level 84. It excretely shows how th e compression works in Module C were close to many sensitive areas in Module D, such as the make Room, the Electrical Power Gas Turbine Generators, the essential diesel engine engine Generator, the Fire Pumps manual of arms tone down Panel and some of the Electrical Switch Rooms. The Accommodation Block, where the crewmen lived, was located above Module D, with the whirlybird in compressede (or Helideck) on top of it as shown in Figure 3.Figure 4 Production Level 84 FirewallsHazard Blast-Proof WallsSince Piper Alpha was initially designed to produce oil, notwithstanding Fire-Proofed walls were installed to separate its four modules instead of Blast-Proof walls, which are installed on gas production platforms. Figure 4 shows the locations of the Fire-Proofed walls as well as their ratings. The B/C and the C/D walls did not withstand the depression explosion. Their failure was the beginning of the end for the platform.Hazard Fire-Fighting SystemPiper Alpha was render with a state-of-the-art Automatic Fire-Fighting System. It relied on two different sets of pumps for operation electrically powered and diesel powered. They would suck in huge amounts of seawater via underwater inlets to inconvenience any fires. However, the safety routines on the platform dictated that the system would be switched over to manual control in case divers were in the water regardless of their locations with respect to the inlets so that they would not get sucked in. That procedure neer considered the possibility of a fire or an explosion blocking access to the Manual Control Panel, preventing the crew from operating the pumps and eventually causing the fire to rage unchallenged.ii deck support frame level 64Two overlarge gas pumps, designated A and B, were pose in Module C. Those were responsible for pressurizing the produced gas and sending it to the offshore Manifold Compression platform MCP-01, some thirty miles to the North West of Piper Alpha. They were also responsible for providing the gas required for generating Electrical Power that fed the entire platform. They operated in redundancy i.e. one was operated and the other was put on standby in case the former stopped working. Those two pumps were present on level 68, sixteen levels below production level recite 84.Figure 5 Deck Support Frame of Level 68 Location of Pumps A BA pipeline eighteen inches in diam acted as the Main Gas Line (MGL), carrying the gas production of Piper Alpha to the Manifold Compression Platform, MCP-01. A year later, some other eighteen-inch pipeline was extend from the Tartan platform to Piper Alpha, in order to collect gas production from both rigs before sending it on the Main Gas Line to MCP-01. Later on, another sixteen-inch pipeline was extended from Piper Alpha to the Claymore production platform, to feed its onboard Gas Lift System.Hazard Gas LinesIn Figure 5, all gas lines also known as risers were secured with automatic taking into custody Safety Valves (ESVs) and Pig Traps to cut off gas time period in an out of the platform in case of emergencies and failures. However, there were no Remotely Operated Shutoff Valves (ROSOVs) on any of the lines that the neighbouring platforms could use in case the ESVs had failed or in case things on Piper Alpha had gone out of control. Moreover, two years prior to June the 6th 1988, Occidental Petroleum commissioned a report to investigate the safety of the platform after the added functionality and pipelines. The report portrayed a fearful image, clearly warning of the dangers of the gas lines. The findings stated that those gas lines would take hours to depressurize, mainly due to their capacities that was defined based on their lengths and diameters. The report went on to speculate that should anything happen to those lines, they could result in a High-Pressure Gas Fire that would be virtually impracticable to fight. Thus, putting the entire platform at risk, and threatening the lives of its personnel.Impact on the Pipeline networkSince the Piper oilfield was the first to be discovered, and Piper Alpha was the first platform to come online, its historic development and that of adjacent fields meant that the platform would become a centre for communication systems, as well as oil transfer, reaching land-based operations (Drysdale Evans, 1998). The belated installation of the Gas Module, and the subsequent extension of Gas Lines, further complicated an already complex network of pipelines interconnecting the three platforms Claymore, Piper Alpha, and Tartan with one another as well as with MCP-01 and the Flotta oil processing facility.Figure 6 shows this complex network of oil and Gas Lines connecting the four platforms and onshore installations. The Main Oil Line (MOL) carried oil from Piper to Flotta. Oil was routed from Tartan to Claymore, via a separate line, and from there it was sent onto the MOL, some thirty-five miles atomic number 74 of Piper. The MOL also carried the main communication cable (originating at Piper Alpha) between the three rigs and Occidentals Control Centre (OCC) on the Orkney Islands.Hazard Oil game PressureThe legacy of that design had not only reduced the level of Operational Safety on board of Piper Alpha significantly, but also it had put the entire communication system at risk. The design simply jeopardized losing all cable-based communications with OCC, in case an explosion or a massive rig fire took place. Furthermore, due to the lack of any Remotely Operated Shutoff Valves (ROSOVs) which would prevent the back flow of oil because of pressure differences and/or major failures in the Emergency Safety Valves (ESVs) the design exhibited a Back-Pressure nature that would allow oil from the Tartan and Claymore platforms to flow directly back into Piper Alpha instead of pass down the Main Oil Line to shore should Piper Alpha stop pumping oil. That hazard was an important factor in fuelling the oil fire that started in the Oil Separation compartment in Module B on board of the platform in peril.Figure 6 Claymore, Piper, Tartan Pipeline Network verticillated to disasterThe common image of the disaster can be attributed to a single devastating explosion on board the Piper Alpha. In fact, at once it took place, the catastrophe unfolded gradually. During one crucial hour, there were critical moments that it could have been averted. However, an unfortunate series of events led to the total destruction of the platform.On the morning of July the 6th, Pump A was undergoing routine maintenance and its pressure valve was removed for inspection. Another maintenance overhaul, which would have taken two weeks, was scheduled for the same pump but had not begun then. The valve removed was placed between the pump and the gas pipe sustenance it. The service crew sealed the pipe with a Blind Flange a flat metallic disc used to temporarily cover pipes and risers during various routine maint enance jobs. When the Day Shift ended at 600 PM, the job was not done. The supervising engineer prepared a Permit-to-Work (PTW) stating that the pressure valve was removed and that the pump should not be started under any circumstance (Wikipedia, 2010).The engineer then headed to the Control Room, where he found the platforms manager busy. He chose not to inform him that Pump A was out of order, and instead signed the new PTW, placed it on the managers desk and left to the Accommodation Block. This was the first critical moment in the timeline of the accident. The failure of the engineer to inform the manager with the serious condition of the pump is nothing but a clear example of terrible lack of communication between colleagues. It showcases a superficial attitude and approach by Occidentals personnel towards Safety. This failure is one of the main reasons of the disaster, if not its main trigger.An hour later, another maintenance job was taking place underwater divers were carry ing out a routine inspection and weld job on one of the pipes. Therefore, and as we explained previously, the Automatic Fire-Fighting System was switched to manual control. This was a safety practice to check over that divers would not get sucked in through the underwater inlets of the powerful fire extinguishing pumps. It is worth noting that on other platforms Fire-Fighting systems were controlled manually only if divers were very close to the inlets. This practice, which was enforced to ensure the safety of the divers, reduced that of the platform drastically and deprived it from an automated response by the Fire-Fighting System that could have saved it from its fatal doom yet another critical moment down the course of the horrible disaster.At 945 PM, Pump B suddenly stopped and could not be restarted. The pumps were responsible for providing gas to the Gas Turbine Generators, which in turn provided the entire platform with Electrical Power. The sudden stop of Pump B, and the fa ilure to restart it, threatened the total loss of Electrical Power during ongoing drilling operations. This meant that the drilling head could get stuck at enormous costs. The system provided fifteen minutes of backup power, via the Emergency Diesel Generator, during which the only two choices were either restarting Pump B or obstetrical delivery Pump A online a crossroads that sent the platform and its crewmen down the coil to disaster.Pressured as time went by with no success at restarting Pump B, the engineer who was sent down to inspect the pump was forced to consider bringing Pump A online. He returned to the Control Room on level 84 and searched through the PTWs, trying to determine whether Pump A could be started or not. He located the PTW for the General go across that had not started then, yet failed to find the newer one that stated that the pumps pressure valve was removed. He signed off the General Overhaul PTW and returned to level 68 to start Pump A.The reason why th e engineer could not find the newer PTW is simple the pressure valve was in a different location from the pump and therefore its permits were stored in a different corner, as PTWs on board the platform were sorted by location. The engineer never checked the PTW box for the location where the pressure valve was. None of the personnel present in the Control Room then was aware that a vital piece of the pump had been removed. The platforms manager assumed from the existing documents that it would be safe to start Pump A (Wikipedia, 2010).In fact, no one noticed that the pressure valve had been removed as it was placed several metres above the ground of level 64. Furthermore, it was blocked from line-of-sight by gas risers. Ten minutes later, Pump A was started, allowing gas to flow into it in the absence seizure of the pressure valve, which quickly resulted in an overpressure the Blind Flange could not withstand. Gas started to leak at very high pressure and in great amounts, with lo ud sounds that took the crewmen on level 64 by surprise. The leak triggered several gas alarms. However, at exactly 950 PM, and before anyone could realize the situation and object a response, the gas ignited and blow up, blowing through the Fire-Proofed walls.In the initial blast, the Fire-Proofed walls B/C and C/D failed. Panels from the C/D wall were propelled into Module D, destroying the Control Room, the Emergency Diesel Generator, and the Gas Turbine Generators, starting a hydrocarbon fire fed by a mixture of gas and diesel and blocking access to both the Manual Control Panel of the Fire-Fighting System as well as the Life gravy holder Entry Points. The platforms manager quickly pressed the Emergency Shutdown button, closing the Emergency Safety Valves (ESVs) on the sea lines and ceasing all oil and gas production, before ordering an evacuation of the Control Room. This should have isolated the platform entirely from the flow of oil and gas. However, Panels from the fail ing B/C Fire-Proofed wall flew into Module B, rupturing another gas pipe as well as the main oil breakup manifolds, starting an oil fire in the Oil Separation compartment, which spread out to all of Module B within a few minutes.Figure 7 The Initial Fire on Piper Alpha. Black smoke indicating an Oil Fire is seen rising from Module BThe manager headed to the Radio Room, where he ordered a Mayday call to be transmitted. The Radio Room was then evacuated and all personnel headed to the Fire-Proofed Accommodation Block awaiting further book of instructions or evacuation by helicopters.Although Occidentals management was aware that a gas explosion on board Piper Alpha would be devastating, the managers on Claymore and Tartan never Shutdown oil production after they received the Mayday transmitted out of the burning platform. Even though black smoke could be seen on the horizon, which meant that there was an oil fire, the managers never suspected the failure of the Emergency Safety Val ves (ESVs). The oil fire, fed by oil from Tartan and Claymore, heated up the Tartan Gas Line to the point it failed. The pipeline ruptured, releasing 1530 tonnes of gas (pressurised to 120 ATM) per second. The gas burst into a massive fire ball that engulfed the entire Piper Alpha platform as well as a Fast Rescue Craft launched from the Multi-purpose Vessel Sandhaven. This situation was exactly what the report commissioned two years earlier had warned against a High-Pressure Gas Fire that would be impossible to put out. At this critical moment, the fate of the platform had already been decided, with no viable means of reversing it. The massive fire ball can be seen in Figure 8, as it instantaneously contained the platform and darkened the clear blue sky above it.Figure 8 Sequence of Images taken from a Video Footage captured by a Support Vessel showing the enlargement of the Tartan Gas Line. MV Lowland cavalier can be seen on the RightAs Figure 8 vividly illustrates, the wind wa s blowing in the direction of the Helideck, which in turn pushed fire and smoke towards it, making any helicopter landing absolutely impossible and an act of suicide. No further instructions were given to the trapped crewmen, who took shelter in the Accommodation Block, while smoke began to penetrate it. Some were seen jumping off the platform and into the water, against what their training instructed. Ironically, those were the ones who survived the tragic ordeal. The actions of two crewmen are worth noting. As the situation worsened, they donned Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and tried to make their way to the Manual Control Panel of the Fire-Fighting System to start the diesel pumps. Those two men were never seen again and their bodies were never recovered.Nearby, and as the situation rapidly escalated, the managers on Claymore and Tartan believed that they did not have the authority to order an Emergency Shutdown of production without first consulting their superiors. The i nitial explosion knocked off the main communication line with OCC however, Tartans manager somehow contacted his superior, and was instructed to stay online and continue pumping gas and oil. Meanwhile, Claymores manager tried for more than twenty minutes to raise OCC by satellite phone, but to no avail. When he finally succeeded at contacting his manger, the MCP 01 Gas Line failed and exploded, as they were speaking, at exactly 1050 PM. It was not until that point that Claymores manager finally ordered an Emergency Shutdown of production, after receiving instructions from his superior, who also instructed him to contact Tartan and tell them to shutdown as well.Figure 9 Sequence of Images taken from a Video Footage captured by a Rescue Helicopter showing the Explosion of the MCP 01 Gas Line. The MSV Tharos can be seen on the RightBy the time both platforms had ordered an Emergency Shutdown, there was no bout back for Piper Alpha the platform was destined to burn for hours more to come, until the pipelines were depressurised, and all the hydrocarbons they carried were depleted. The fearsome heat ate its way at the machinery and steelwork comprising the once wide platform in a tremendous scene that horrified everyone who saw it.The final chapter in the disaster was inevitable and quite expectable. The gas line feeding Claymore finally failed and ruptured at 1120 PM. The third explosion was the final nail in the platforms coffin. After withstanding the intense heat for more than an hour, the extension and Utilities Module D, home to the Accommodation Block, finally slid into the sea. Most of the platform soon fell after it. Forty-five minutes past midnight, the entire platform was gone, and only Module A was all that remained.Figure 10 Image from Video Footage taken by a Rescue Helicopter landing on the MSV-Tharos as the Final Explosion of Claymores Gas Line take placeThe Role of nearby Support vesselsThe Multi-purpose vessel LowLand cavalier (mv lowland c avalier)Although the Lowland Cavalier was the closest to Piper Alpha at the time of the initial explosion, she was only equipped as a Diving Support vessel then. She pulled away to safety immediately, after signalling the underwater divers to surface. Her role in the disaster was limited to reporting the first explosion.Figure 11 Recent Photos of the MV Lowland CavalierThe Multi-purpose vessel Silver Pit (mv silver pit)The Fast Rescue Craft MV Silver Pit was a converted fishing ship, with a itsy-bitsy Landing Area (yellow circular area seen in Figure 9). It was the first support vessel to respond. The largest number of survivors thirty-seven out of fifty-nine was recovered by her crew. Her coxswain, James Clark, received the George Medal a second level civil decoration of the get together Kingdom Commonwealth in deferred payment of his tremendous efforts in the Search Rescue operation (Scottish TV, 2010).Figure 12 Image taken from a Video taken by a Rescue Helicopter dur ing a Winch-Recovery of a Survivor picked up by the MV Silver Pitthe Multi-purpose vessel sandhaven (mv sandhaven)Though her actions show obvious disregard for common logic and safe practices, the efforts exerted by the crew of the Sandhaven were remarkable they raced against time to rescue Pipers oilmen from the raging inferno. In an insane act of bravery, and in defiance to every safety rule and procedure known in the world of Offshore Rescue Operations, she approached the burning platform to a very close distance, launching a fast rescue boat with three men on board that rescued six of Pipers crewmen. However, when the gas line from Tartan exploded, a massive fire ball engulfed the burning platform as well as that boat, killing two of its crewmen along with all of survivors. The lone survivor on board that boat, Ian Letham, was also awarded the George Medal in recognition of his participation in the relief efforts during the tragic ordeal.Figure 13 The Tharos (Left Background ) Sandhaven (Small Red Boat) next to Piper Alpha just as Tartans Gas line explodedthe Multi-purpose Support Vessel Tharos (msv tharos)The Tharos was a semi-submersible, multi-purpose support vessel. She comprised several roles such as Fire-Fighting, Construction, Accommodation and Diving Support. She also carried a fully operational hospital and was equipped with a massive Helideck. She was commissioned by Occidental Petroleum precisely to deal with emergencies on offshore platforms. On June the 6th, 1988, and by pure chance, she was anchored close to Piper Alpha. She should have been a Godsend however, upon approaching the burning platform, her crew started her water cannons too fast, tripping the Fire-Fighting system and wasting ten long minutes before successfully restarting it. Furthermore, those cannons were deemed very powerful, thus restricting the Tharos to as where to use them since the stream could seriously injure or even kill anyone it hits.Figure 14 Images taken from Video Footage taken during the landing of a Rescue Helicopter on the Helideck on board the MSV-Tharos showing the Vessels powerful cannons engaged in Fire-Fighting OperationsFigure 12 shows how close the Tharos was anchored to Piper as well as the locations of the MV -Lowland Cavalier and the MV Silver Pit mentioned earlier in this section.Figure 15 Locations of Support Vessels from Piper AlphaWorse still, the Tharos was equipped with an extensible bridge that could have worked as an escape route for the personnel trapped onboard, but due to flaws in its design it proved useless. The extension mechanism was too slow, taking five minutes to move two feet so to extend to its full thirty metres, it would have taken over an hour. At 1050 PM, the Tharos ran out of time the MCP-01 Gas Line ruptured and burst. A huge fireball burnt brilliantly in the dark sky over the North Sea, and to date is considered an icon of the Piper Alpha disaster. The gas burning was more than the entire consump tion of the United Kingdom. The intense heat threw the Tharos back, forcing her to return the bridge into its storage position, and from then on, her crew could only witness as Piper slowly melted and collapsed (McGinty, 2009).Figure 16 Screenshot from a Video Footage taken by a Surveillance Camera on board the MSV-Tharos showing the Extensible Bridge being extended towards Piper AlphaFigure 17 The Tharos docked to Piper Alpha via its Extensible Bridge Weeks before the DisasterFigure 10 shows the extensible bridge docked to Piper Alpha weeks before the disaster. Had the Tharos attempted to approach Piper to such a close distance, the situation would have turned into a nightmare, and the Tharos would have been engulfed in flames just like the Sandhaven. The Tharos continued fighting the fire from a safe distance until the morning of the following day.Divers from the Tharos recovered many bodies from the sea bed and from the galley area of the Accommodation Block, where most of the cr ewmen onboard gathered awaiting extraction by helicopter. The vessel supported the Fire-Fighting and Well Kill operations that eventually led to the extinguishing of the burning well three weeks later (Wikipedia, 2010).The AftermathThe Day AfterWith the break of light of the following day, the scale of the disaster was unravelled. The entire platform melted down to its core through the night and sank into the sea. Ironically, Module A, once considered the most dangerous section of the platform, remained fairly intact. That was attributed to the fact that the Fire-Proofed wall separating modules A and B did not fail. Of the massive platform, only what shows in Figures 15 and 16 was what was left.Figure 18 Module A carrying a sign with the platforms number and name Piper AFigure 19 The Remains of Piper Alpha with the MSV-Tharos in the BackgroundHuman LossA total of a hundred and sixty seven men lost their lives in the disaster of which, a hundred and sixty five were Piper Alpha crewm en. A hundred and sixty four of them died on site and one died later in hospital. Two crewmen from the MV Sandhaven died, along with six survivors from the platform, when their fast rescue craft was engulfed in flames after the explosion of Tartans gas link.Only sixty one men survived, almost all because they had decided to ignore what little training they had been given and jumped off the burning platform.Financial LossThe total financial loss amounted to U.S. $3.4 billion. It was paid in full by insurance companies that insured the platform and the personnel against operational hazards. The insurance companies also covered the cost of the Clean-Up operation. misemploy to Public ImageOccidental Petroleum claimed that their Safety Record was impeccable, claiming that it was the first time in twelve years that they had had a causality in the North Sea. However, their statement was challenged when various sources revealed that an oilman died four years earlier on board Piper Alph